The detention of the first two citizens of the People’s Republic of China who fought on Russia’s side is not, of course, irrefutable proof of Beijing’s official participation in the war against Ukraine. Perhaps they went to the front for personal reasons—money, convictions, or their own choice. But anyone who has even the slightest understanding of how the PRC’s political system works cannot fail to realize how the authorities in Beijing respond to such actions. A citizen of that country always knows where the boundary of what is permitted lies—and what crossing it means. Therefore, the decision to fight for Russia will not be a reason for persecution at home. And therein lies the key to understanding China’s role in this war.
Global media have already confirmed President Volodymyr Zelensky’s statement that there are quite a few PRC citizens on the aggressor’s side. Chinese officers are not visible on the front lines, of course, but they are present—nearby, in the rear, observing. China is not merely watching the war. It is studying it. And this is not a neutral interest—it is systematic work aimed at accumulating knowledge, experience, and tactics that may come in handy in the next war. A war in which China may no longer remain in the shadows.
Beijing and Pyongyang are allies, but each acts according to its own capabilities. Kim Jong-un can afford a demonstrative presence—his soldiers and officers are gaining combat experience against a real enemy, as was the case in the Kursk region. Xi Jinping does not enjoy that “luxury”—at least not yet. But one should not mistake restraint for indifference. China is here. Its presence is reflected in the petroyuan that keeps Russia’s economy afloat and allows it to sustain its war budget. In the CNC machines that manufacture missiles. In dual-use goods that enable the Kremlin to compensate for technological isolation. China is the largest buyer of Russian oil. China is the leading supplier of equipment for Russia’s military-industrial complex. China is Putin’s main economic savior.
And while Beijing speaks of neutrality, in practice it is China that does everything to ensure the war continues. Because this war is not just a conflict over territories. It is a war for a new global architecture. It is a war in which Russia is the guarantor of China’s interests. It is a war where two visions of the future clash on the Ukrainian front: the liberal West and the authoritarian East.
The capture of Chinese citizens is also an opportunity to remind the United States: Ukraine is not merely defending itself against an aggressor. This is not a “local conflict,” as Putin tries to portray it while convincing President Trump’s special representative Steve Witkoff. It is a global war in which a new world order is being formed. And that is precisely why Beijing is interested in Russia’s victory. Because Putin’s victory is also China’s victory. It is the advance of the authoritarian world’s borders deeper into Europe.
And that is why the time has come to stop entertaining fantasies about a potential rift between Moscow and Beijing. This is an illusion, and President Trump will have to realize this, just as all his post-Soviet predecessors did. Instead of dreaming about distancing Russia from China, the focus should be on another question: how to limit Beijing’s influence in Europe—even at Moscow’s expense. Because wherever there is more China, there is less America. And this does not apply solely to Europe.
Author: Vitaly Portnikov