On December 5, the White House published the doctrine “U.S. National Security Strategy” which proclaims its goal: to make the United States “a great, thriving, and successful nation.” Will it achieve this goal?
A nation exhausted by its role as the world’s policeman
The doctrine begins by asserting that American “elites” have burdened the United States with an excessive role in guarding the world order.
“After the end of the Cold War, America’s foreign policy elites convinced themselves that permanent American dominance around the world was in our country’s best interests. Yet other countries’ affairs concern us only when their actions directly threaten our interests. Our elites were gravely mistaken about America’s willingness to forever bear the global burden in which the American people saw no connection to national interests. They overestimated America’s ability to simultaneously fund an enormous welfare state based on a regulatory-administrative system, along with massive military, diplomatic, intelligence, and foreign aid complexes. They made extraordinarily mistaken and destructive bets on globalism and so-called ‘free trade,’ which hollowed out the very base of the middle class and industry upon which America’s economic and military advantages depend. They allowed allies and partners to shift the costs of their defense onto the American people, and sometimes to drag us into conflicts and disputes that are central to their interests but peripheral to our own. They tied American policy to a network of international institutions — some governed by overt anti-Americanism, many driven by transnationalism that clearly aims to erode the sovereignty of individual states. Thus, our elites pursued not only a fundamentally undesirable and impossible goal; they also undermined the very means needed to achieve it: the character of our nation on which its strength, wealth, and dignity were built,” the doctrine states.
When compared with American policy over the past 30 years, these claims nearly mirror the real state of affairs and the genuine problems the United States faces today. Indeed, U.S. attempts to reform Afghanistan and Iraq into states more favorable to regional stability and American interests failed. The current political regimes in both countries are more anti-American than they were before U.S. military operations began — operations that turned into occupations without a clear long-term strategy and without any dignified conclusion. The disordered withdrawal, verging on flight, left a power vacuum quickly filled by local radical forces tied to Iran—a regime that remains an irreconcilable enemy of the United States.
Also striking is how vital U.S. interests in its own “backyard” — Central and South America—were pushed to the background. We may logically assume (though this requires further research) that diminishing attention to this region was at least partly caused by the priorities the United States considered paramount after WWII: Europe and, since the 1960s, the Middle East. Concentrating military, economic, and diplomatic work on Europe and the Middle East may have weakened interest in the Western Hemisphere. Yet this distribution of focus stemmed not from elite error but from real needs that emerged after the victory over Nazi Germany: to secure peace in Europe through building sovereign, economically successful states linked to the U.S. through NATO. After the start of the Cold War — again, in response to a real threat — this alliance became essential for the United States as its guarantor and earned it the reputation of a reliable partner. In contrast to failures in the 2000s and 2010s, U.S. policy in Europe has been a continuous “success story.” American policy in the Middle East during the second half of the 20th century was largely successful as well: a reliable alliance with Israel ensured its victories over Soviet-backed Arab states and laid the foundation for peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan.
These successes in Europe and the Middle East made the United States the leading guardian of principles that ensured lasting peace and economic prosperity in Europe, which in turn provided the peaceful and stable development of the United States itself.
At the same time, the U.S. suffered failure in Vietnam, effectively yielding the country to global communism — namely, the USSR and China.
The United States helped bring down the USSR as the cornerstone of global communism, but failed to integrate post-Soviet Russia into the democratic world because Russia’s ruling class rejected the very idea of democratic governance.
From the sum of political processes in the late 20th and early 21st centuries in which the U.S. participated (to varying degrees), a clear limit of American capabilities emerges: the U.S. can cooperate with other states to ensure stability, peace, and economic development but it cannot rebuild other states in its own image, especially outside Europe. Hence one of the doctrine’s core principles: the U.S. can no longer be the “world’s policeman.” This is an objective reality.
Thus, the doctrine’s task is to redistribute the burden of safeguarding the global order and international trade between the U.S. and other states — primarily allies, but also countries outside U.S. alliances. Naturally, the U.S. must first and foremost secure its own interests: national security, trade, and influence on regional global processes.
But does this doctrine help achieve its stated goals?
First and foremost — the home hemisphere
“We want the Western Hemisphere to remain stable enough and well governed enough to prevent mass migration to the United States and to impede it; we want a hemisphere whose governments cooperate with us against narcoterrorists, cartels, and other transnational criminal organizations; we want a hemisphere free from hostile foreign intrusion or control of key assets, and supportive of critical supply chains; and we want to secure our continued access to key strategic locations.”
To achieve these goals, the strategy proposes “engagement and expansion”—meaning pushing out “non-Western Hemisphere players” (i.e., Russia and China) and replacing them with U.S. influence.
“We will engage long-standing friends in the hemisphere to control migration, stop drug flows, and strengthen stability and security on land and at sea. We will expand by cultivating new partners while making America more attractive as an economic and security partner. U.S. policy must focus on drawing in regional leaders who can help create acceptable stability in the region, even beyond their borders. These countries would help us stop illegal and destabilizing migration, neutralize cartels, develop near-shore manufacturing, and grow local private economies. We will reward and encourage governments, parties, and movements aligned with our principles and strategy. But we must not neglect governments with different views if we still share interests, and they want to cooperate with us.”
This is a declaration of overt political interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states neighboring the U.S. — contradicting the same doctrine’s proclaimed principle of “non-interference.” Comparing this doctrine with actual regional policy — especially toward Venezuela — one may conclude that the White House is indeed preparing to push the country toward removing Nicolás Maduro. His regime is a left-wing dictatorship, recently signed a “strategic alliance” with Russia, cooperates closely with China, and is considered illegitimate due to widely denounced electoral fraud. Brutal repression fuels mass migration to the U.S. Thus, the doctrine’s prerequisites for intervention are fully present. Whether Trump will undertake operations that could topple Maduro remains unclear—but the scale of U.S. military preparations suggests such an option is seriously considered. Will such an intervention succeed for the U.S.? There is reason for doubt. Trump is dismantling democratic foundations at home — how could he instill democratic foundations in an anti-American foreign state? And how would he react if Venezuelans elect someone the White House does not prefer? Could the consequences be as disastrous as U.S. attempts to build democracy in Iraq or Afghanistan?
According to the doctrine, the U.S. will redirect significant — perhaps its largest — share of military, intelligence, and economic resources to the Western Hemisphere, reducing attention to Europe and somewhat to the Middle East.
A key policy element is developing strategic natural resources jointly with regional partners:
“The Western Hemisphere is home to many strategic resources that America must develop in partnership with regional allies to make neighboring countries and our own more successful. The National Security Council will immediately begin a robust interagency process to task departments, supported by our intelligence community’s analytical unit, to identify strategic locations and resources in the hemisphere for protection and joint development.”
Correcting trade distortions, primarily with China
Regarding China, the strategy defines U.S. goals as economic competition and preventing war:
“Trade with China must be balanced and focused on non-sensitive areas (…) Importantly, this must be paired with strong and sustained attention to deterrence to prevent war in the Indo-Pacific. Such a combined approach can create a virtuous cycle: strong American deterrence creates space for more disciplined economic actions, while more disciplined economic actions increase resources for long-term deterrence.”
Whether the White House can rebalance trade with China is uncertain. In his first year, Trump repeatedly attempted to impose tariffs; Beijing responded with its own tariffs, triggering stock market declines and spikes in consumer prices — provoking protests from American consumers. The two superpowers are too economically intertwined to take radical measures easily.
The doctrine suggests redistributing some of China-U.S. trade among U.S. allies:
“We must encourage Europe, Japan, Korea, Australia, Canada, Mexico, and other leading countries to adopt trade policies that help rebalance China’s economy toward household consumption, since Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East cannot absorb China’s massive excess capacity on their own. Exporting nations of Europe and Asia may also view middle-income countries as a limited but growing market for their exports.”
Whether this will work remains an open question. Regarding Taiwan, the U.S. will “maintain the status quo,” but in partnership with other regional states, due to Taiwan’s dominance in semiconductor production and its geostrategic importance.
Europe: “Become what I want you to be”?
Policy toward Europe is outlined only in broad principles. The doctrine suggests Europe is undergoing “civilizational erosion,” losing identity and “self-confidence” due to excessive “transnational regulation” — i.e., the European Union allegedly stifles free political expression and overregulates the economy, causing GDP to fall “from 25% of global output to 14%.”
The document provides no clarity on what the White House actually wants Europe to become — just vague contours:
“We want Europe to remain European, to restore its civilizational self-confidence, and to abandon its failed focus on regulatory strangulation.” It recalls an old song: “If I invented you, become what I want you to be!”
The greatest success of U.S. foreign policy since the mid-20th century a peaceful, united, prosperous Europe is portrayed as a failure exploiting poor, unfortunate America.
Yet: “Europe remains strategically and culturally vital to the United States. Transatlantic trade is a pillar of the global economy and of American prosperity. Europe’s sectors—from manufacturing to technology and energy — are among the world’s strongest. Europe is home to leading research and cultural institutions. Not only can we not afford to write Europe off it would undermine what this strategy seeks to achieve.”
Still, Europe must change, and the U.S. must “help”:
“American diplomacy must continue to defend genuine democracy, free speech, and the unapologetic celebration of the individual character and history of European nations. America encourages its political allies in Europe to support such a revival, and the growing influence of patriotic European parties gives grounds for optimism. Our goal must be to help Europe correct its current trajectory. We will need a strong Europe that can help us compete successfully and work with us to prevent any adversary from dominating Europe.”
But what exactly is “genuine democracy”? What “patriotic” parties are meant—and who, then, is “unpatriotic”?
These empty formulas suggest the White House lacks a clear European strategy. Hints appear only in Vice President Vance’s infamous speech at the Munich Security Conference, where he complained that Europe supposedly suppresses political forces ideologically close to Trump — namely, right-wing radical parties. Yet unlike Trump’s America, Europe has not forgotten the lessons of WWII or the Cold War. It knows well the dangers posed by radical movements and by Putin’s Russia.
Relations with Russia are also vaguely defined:
“This lack of confidence is most visible in Europe’s relations with Russia. European allies have significant hard-power advantages over Russia in nearly all categories except nuclear weapons. As a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Europe’s relations with Russia are now deeply weakened, and many Europeans view Russia as an existential threat. Managing Europe’s relations with Russia will require extensive U.S. diplomatic engagement to restore conditions for strategic stability across the Eurasian continent and reduce the risk of conflict between Russia and European states.”
Yet the “management” displayed so far by Trump and his envoys only encourages the Russian dictator to continue the war and escalate tensions with Europe. European leaders are instead urgently trying to constrain Trump’s “reformist impulses,” warn him of the danger of appeasing a dictator, and preserve the principles on which the EU is built.
Ukraine is mentioned only briefly to reassure readers that Trump will not abandon it:
“It is in the vital interests of the United States to reach a rapid cessation of hostilities in Ukraine to stabilize European economies, prevent unintended escalation or expansion of the war, restore strategic stability with Russia, and ensure post-war reconstruction of Ukraine so it survives as a viable state.”
But what is meant by “strategic stability with Russia”? Is Russia no longer an adversary?
Only one point is spelled out clearly: “Ending the perception and preventing the reality of NATO as a perpetually expanding alliance.” Is this to appease Mr. P.? Or is every country now barred from joining?
Overall, the doctrine suggests that under the 47th president, America is giving up not only its role as “world policeman” (partially justified) but also its role as guardian of democratic values in its most important region — Europe. Whether it will uphold these values elsewhere, including in the Western Hemisphere, is doubtful. Facing a Russia increasingly emboldened by impunity, this means exposing the main stronghold of Western civilization at the moment of its greatest danger.
History shows: whenever America withdrew from Europe, the continent descended into war — World War I and World War II. If Trump and Putin succeed in dismantling the European Union, a new partition of the continent may follow.
One hope remains: a Democratic victory in the 2026 midterms in at least one chamber of Congress. Then at least the most radical Trump initiatives will be met with checks and balances.
Collage: VM
Author: Nadiya Banchyk
