The first weeks of Donald Trump’s presidency have been spent by Ukrainians in anticipation of details regarding the new U.S. leader’s approach to ending the war. During his election campaign, Trump famously spoke about 24 or 48 hours in which he would manage to end the war upon his return to power. These words were believed not only in the United States but also in Ukraine. However, the elections passed, the inauguration ceremony took place, and the new president began speaking about 100 days—within which he aimed to reach a resolution on ending the war. For now, it’s 100.
A positive aspect for Ukraine is that Trump, who did not even mention the Russian-Ukrainian war in his inaugural speech, has been consistently returning to the Ukrainian issue since taking office in the Oval Office. He continues to insist that he will make efforts to end the war. This indicates that the president understands that his electoral promise will be constantly brought up and that his ability to fulfill it will be a defining feature of his "peace through strength" doctrine. However, if he fails to achieve anything—or worse, if Russia strengthens its position in the conflict—it could not only damage Trump’s political reputation but also impact the preparations for the upcoming congressional midterms, which will begin in just a few months. Trump is well aware that in the political landscape he is trying to shape, losing control of Congress would effectively mean losing power.
Yet, no concrete plan has been presented—not from the American president, nor from his new Secretary of State Marco Rubio, nor from Trump’s special envoy Keith Kellogg. So far, the president and his team have limited themselves to statements rather than providing details of a plan. They assert that both sides will have to make concessions to achieve peace but fail to specify what those concessions should be. Most importantly, they do not explain how they intend to force Putin into making any.
It is evident that any real understanding of the situation will only emerge after the first meeting between the American and Russian presidents. Trump has repeatedly stated that he is ready for such a meeting, and Putin allegedly wants to see him just as much. In response, we have heard from the Kremlin that the Russian president is indeed willing to negotiate with his American counterpart but is waiting for signals from Washington—signals that have yet to appear. How long this diplomatic ping-pong will continue remains difficult to predict, just as it is unclear what outcomes a Trump-Putin summit—if it actually takes place—would yield.
What is clear, however, is that the American president is primarily focused on results, whereas the Russian president needs a meeting for the sake of having a meeting. The very fact that the Russian president would be sitting down with the U.S. president three years after his predecessor severed all contacts in protest against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine would mark the failure of Kremlin’s diplomatic isolation and an undeniable victory for Putin. And this is precisely the kind of victory Putin craves.
But will Trump grant him such an opportunity if there is not even a preliminary prospect of reaching an agreement to end the war? After all, if the American president leaves the summit as a peacemaker, no one will criticize him for breaking Putin’s isolation. Biden refused to meet with him, and the war continued; but if Trump meets with Putin and achieves "peace through strength," he would be seen as a dealmaker. However, if Trump leaves the summit empty-handed, the perception of his meeting with the Russian president will be entirely different.
This raises the question: what tools does Trump have to convince the Russian president to end the war—and to do so in a way that does not lead to the collapse of Ukraine as a state or pave the way for another Russian invasion? In reality, there aren’t many such tools at his disposal. Tariffs and trade duties do not play a significant role in U.S.-Russia relations. Given the current economic climate, Trump is unlikely to achieve a serious and long-term reduction in oil prices. This leaves only the option of tightening sanctions against Russia, particularly against its energy sector and its shadow tanker fleet. This could yield significant—but not immediate—results.
At the same time, none of us can claim to fully understand the true state of the Russian economy. One thing is certain—whatever the reality may be, Putin will bluff in front of Trump and attempt to secure the best possible terms for himself, even if he is genuinely interested in at least a temporary truce. So, will the American president recognize this bluff? And will he realize that no amount of pressure on Ukraine—an easier target than the Kremlin, of course—can substitute for real pressure on Russia?
In the political chaos of recent weeks, it is futile to search for an answer to this question. All that remains is to wait for "Trump’s plan."
Author: Vitaly Portnikov