The second inauguration of Donald Trump promises to be one of the most significant events not just of the decade, but of the century – so many expectations and fears are tied to it. However, while the new old president appears to have a clear agenda regarding his domestic political intentions, at least for the first days of his term, his foreign policy remains more a subject of speculation and debate.
Of course, no one is now talking about the 24 or 48 hours allegedly needed to end the russian-Ukrainian war. Trump himself has mentioned a six-month timeframe in which he aims to attempt a resolution. The new president acknowledges that the situation is complex, but does that mean a complicated problem can be solved with simple solutions? At this point, we don’t even know when or under what circumstances a meeting between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin will take place. Trump asserts that Putin desires such a meeting, and I have no reason to doubt this assessment. After all, it is in the Russian president's interest to demonstrate that Russia’s isolation has failed and that the war in Ukraine is no longer a reason to block high-level U.S.-Russian contacts. Still, Putin will do everything possible to show that the meeting is not happening because he needs it, but because Donald Trump wants it to happen. At the very least, there is mutual interest in holding the meeting. And if the American president genuinely seeks an audience with his Russian counterpart, he will have to accept this narrative. Yet this is clearly not Trump’s preferred narrative, as it would showcase the weakness of the U.S. president’s position from the outset.
Now, let’s imagine that the meeting does take place – there is every reason to assume it would be carefully coordinated. Does this mean the contact will be productive? Here, I have serious doubts. For Putin, the meeting would primarily be a “meeting for the sake of meeting.” Trump, on the other hand, will seek at least some tangible result. The outcome of a U.S.-Russia presidential meeting could very well be significant disappointment, once it becomes evident that Putin is not prepared to make any compromises.
And perhaps Ukraine’s own “Day X” will occur precisely when Donald Trump realizes Putin’s unwillingness to end the war on compromise terms. What will the American president do then? Will he increase economic pressure on Russia? Step up arms deliveries to Ukraine? Or, conversely, attempt to distance himself from the war, seeing it as an unpleasant and losing issue?
The manner in which a ceasefire agreement was reached in the Middle East provides some insight into Trump’s toolkit. The U.S. president-elect has been, and remains, firmly on Israel’s side. However, to “calm” Israel’s emotions and secure a successful first day in office, it was the Israeli government that had to make concessions to achieve the agreement. What we are dealing with here is not so much a resolution as a postponement of the conflict in the region – since Hamas now has the opportunity not only to regain its positions in the Gaza Strip but also to strengthen them by releasing hundreds of skilled militants from Israeli prisons in the coming weeks.
If we were to draw a hypothetical parallel with the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, we might envision a scenario in which, once again, the primary pressure to make concessions would fall on Ukraine’s president rather than Russia’s. But the open question remains: to what extent must Ukraine compromise to satisfy Putin? And could we, in the case of the Russian-Ukrainian war, also end up dealing with yet another deferred conflict – since Russia will not abandon its strategic goals.
Of course, we will soon begin to see at least the outlines of answers to these complex questions. But regardless of the answer, one thing remains evident: Ukraine’s fate must not be determined by considerations of political convenience for the new administration but by guarantees for the future – security guarantees for Ukraine’s children.
Author: Vitaly Portnikov